Showing posts with label middle infield quandary. Show all posts
Showing posts with label middle infield quandary. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 15, 2014

14 Minnesota Twins to Watch in '14: Peduardo Florscobar

The 2014 season is just 12 short weeks away.  I decided it might be fun to count down the 14 most important players for the 2014 season.  14 for 14, right!  If I had thought of this two weeks ago, I could have written one per week and the world of symmetry would be in order.  Instead, I'll have to overcome the discomfort this causes and figure out a way to get all 14 in during the next 12 weeks.  To help me out, I have enlisted assistance from my two talking puma friends, Paul and Peter. 

If you don't remember those fine felines, here are their pictures once more:



Now that we're all on the same page, let's discuss the 14th most important player in the organization for 2014:  Peduardo Florscobar


Yikes, I promise to never do that again.

Who is he? 

I promise that this will be the only amalgamation on the list.  Pedro Florimon and Eduardo Escobar are very similar players.  These two are going to be the Twins shortstop in some form or another.  Jason Bartlett may find his way into the mix, but I think the odds of that happening are pretty low.  Florimon is the incumbent and he provided great, but sometimes inconsistent defense and consistently poor offense.  Escobar is a similar player, but two years younger and a bit more exciting. 

Why is he important?

Shortstop is a cornerstone defensive position.  The best teams have a shortstop capable of producing on at least one side of the ball.  Last year, the Twins received good defense and almost no offense from Florimon.  Because of his offensive shortcomings, some "prominent" bloggers are hoping to see more of Escobar in 2014.  Regardless of who plays short for the Twins in 2014, the team will need that player to take care of the balls that are hit his way.  No one expects even average offensive production from Florimon or Escobar, so their defense has to be good enough to provide value. 

Florimon was on pace for a 3.0 WAR season about halfway through 2013.  Then, his defense dipped a bit as he had lapses.  In addition, his offense went from "passable" to "putrid."  Florimon was basically a AAA player in the second half, which is exactly why the door may be open for Escobar.  Escobar is two years younger, has better Minor League stats and might actually be a better defender.  He'll have to impress in March to earn the job as the Twins seem to like Florimon. 

With little available on the free agent market and in the organization, one of these two guys needs to seize their starting opportunity and prove that balls hit toward short will be fielded successfully.  Any offense will be a nice bonus. 

Paul's Take:

I think that the Twins will receive better production at short than we are expecting.  I like watching Florimon.  He makes flashy plays.  He has good range and a good arm.  He might not be the best hitter, but he improved in 2013.  I think he can continue to improve as he learns how to handle MLB pitching.  Florimon was basically a rookie last year, so growing pains are to be expected.  He got better in 2013, so why can't he get even better in 2014? 

If I'm wrong about Florimon, I have faith in Escobar.  The little bits I've seen have impressed me.  He looks flashy in the field; reminds me a bit of Alexi Casilla.  He hit really well at AAA last year too.  He's still super young also.  I also like Escobar because he can play other infield positions.  Just think of how great the left side of the infield would look defensively with Escobar and Florimon.  I've very optimistic about this tandem in 2014. 

Peter's Take:

Ugh.  Seriously, we have to sit through another year of this?  Florimon was awful last year.  He had a 70 OPS+ and that's only because he had a really lucky first half.  He only had one good offensive month and that was May.  He had a .351 BABIP in May.  Good luck doing that consistently!  He hit .201 in the second half!  .201!  If he's such a good fielder, why did he make 18 errors?  I saw him make some pretty boneheaded plays last year.  He's nothing special.

Escobar isn't any better.  He's Florimon but shorter and younger.  Big deal.  His Minor League stats are unimpressive.  His Minor League OPS is under .700.  That's terrible.  Sure, he can play a few positions, but does he play any of them well?  I didn't think he looked great last year.  He's been in the Majors for three years and hasn't earned consistent playing time.  Why would the Twins give him a job now?  The Twins need to upgrade this position fast.  I have no confidence in the Twins' shortstop next year, regardless of who wins this job.

What to look for in '14:

One of these men will win the job.  If that player doesn't produce early, will the team try the other guy?  Florimon has proved that he can be a passable MLB shortstop, at least defensively.  Escobar is an interesting player, but might have a utility ceiling.  Regardless, if one of these two can produce a 2.0 WAR season in 2014, the Twins can be reasonably pleased with their production at short.  If both guys flounder, the Twins may need to take a long look at the free agent options next off-season. 

The Twins do not have a bona fide shortstop prospect on the doorstep.  They have some interesting guys though.  Danny Santana might be in the same mold as Escobar and Florimon and he could be ready in 2015.  Jorge Polanco is a better prospect, but he might be two or even three years away.  Niko Goodrum has great tools and has produced pretty well, but he's an even more long-term project than Polanco.  Looking at the roster right now, the Twins need Peduardo Florscobar to produce for at least one season, if not more.  

Saturday, March 16, 2013

Finding Pedro Florimon's Value


Yesterday, I unveiled what will almost certainly go down in history as my most popular original idea:  a weekly (fake) mailbag.  In that mailbag I asked myself... I mean, I was asked about the Twins player I am higher on than most.  I chose Pedro Florimon because I think his defense can provide enough value to overcome his complete lack of contribution on offense.  I am not sure I explained my point very well and I wasn't feeling good about my selection.

Then, I listened to The Baseball Show with Rany and Joe, a weekly podcast from two baseball writing powerhouses, Joe Sheehan and Rany Jazayerli.  They were talking about the Trevor Bauer trade and how much they hated it.  Basically, the Diamondbacks traded Bauer for Didi Gregorius, an all-glove, no-bat, low-upside player.  Sheehan remarked that they basically traded an elite pitching prospect for Neifi Perez.  This lead me to Perez's FanGraphs page.  Turns out, he posted a 58 wRC+ for his career.  Pedro Florimon posted a 59 wRC+ last season. 

Perez was mostly a glove, and didn't offer much in the hitting and baserunning departments.  This sounds a lot like Pedro Florimon to me.  Sheehan and Jazayerli weren't really questioning Perez or Gregorius as players, but the move to give up a consensus top prospect in order to acquire a player of that caliber.  Gregorius might have more upside than they are giving him, but the point makes sense.  It is also worth noting that Arizona received Lars Anderson and Tony Sipp in that deal, but I'm not sure that really means a whole lot.

The Diamondbacks have their Neifi Perez, but at the cost of a top pitching prospect.  The Twins have their Perez, but got him for basically nothing, claiming him off waivers from Baltimore.  In addition, the Twins have a second Perez, in Eduardo Escobar, and they acquired him in a trade for a player that they had pretty much grown apart from in Francisco Liriano.

So, what's the point? 

I've been investigating middle infielders a lot lately, and I have come to the realization that a good defensive shortstop is a relatively valuable commodity.  Basically, a shortstop with any good quality is pretty rare.  A good offensive shortstop is very rare.  I made that point in a post last weekend (near the bottom in the Addendum).  In addition, good, valuable shortstops are extremely rare, as I posited here.  

Florimon is valuable because he was acquired so cheaply and he makes almost no money.  In addition, he isn't the type of player who will ever earn a lot of money through the arbitration process, as he isn't likely to put up statistics that bring back big paychecks. 

Fine, but how hard is it to get a Florimon or Perez or Gregorius.  The Twins got Florimon cheaply, while Arizona gave up a fair amount.  The only way to really find out is to find more players who fit this profile.  I checked each MLB team's depth chart and found players who roughly fit this profile.  I only used players who project to get significant time at shortstop this coming season.  I found 14 players. 

These players range in their offensive abilities.  Some are as poor as Perez, but others have performed at a higher level.  Each has been considered below average in their offensive contributions though, using wRC+, or has a poor offensive reputation, based on minor league performance.  Now that I have a sample, I investigated how each of these players was acquired by their current team.  Here is the chart:

Player
Team
Salary (in $)
How Acquired?
Seattle
3.25 Mil
Traded for Maikel Cleto
Miami
1.75 Mil
Acquired in Jose Reyes/Josh Johnson/Mark Buehrle Blockbuster
New York M
491 K
Amateur Free Agent
Cincinnati
480 K
2nd Round - 2007 Draft
Pittsburgh
5.5 Mil
Free Agency - 2 yrs/10.5 Mil
St. Louis
League Min
1st Round - 2007 Draft
Arizona
1.75 Mil
Acquired in Chris Young/Heath Bell Trade
Didi Gregorius
Arizona
League Min
Acquired in Trevor Bauer Trade
Boston
2.06 Mil
Amateur Free Agent
San Diego
1.275 Mil
Rule 5 Draft
San Francisco
481 K
4th Round - 2008 Draft
Philadelphia
480 K
Amateur Free Agent
Pedro Florimon
Minnesota
League Min
Waivers
Eduardo Escobar
Minnesota
480 K
Francisco Liriano Trade

Upon first glance, it is easy to see that the Neifi Perez type is more of a National League phenomenon.  Most American League teams can boast players with average offense, but not all of those shortstops provide good defense.  If a better offensive option isn't present, a good defensive shortstop seems to be a worthy trade-off.  It shouldn't really matter where a player provides their value. 

Looking at the cost of each player, we can see that the Twins might pay the least this year and will have given up the least to acquire their Neifi Perez.  This chart includes some early draft picks and some players who were centerpieces in trades for quality MLB players.  Others are rule 5 picks, amateur free agents and waiver claims.  The range of cost for these players is greater than I would have expected. 

While we can debate the true merits of a player like Florimon, if a team chooses to go that route, they could do a lot worse than a waiver claim making the league minimum.  One other thing that I like about a defensive shortstop is that they can have a lucky offensive season, and provide bonus value.  A random, lucky, good defensive season is pretty unlikely.

Many will argue that glove-first shortstops grow on trees.  While this may be true, they aren't showing up in droves on MLB teams, at least not as cheaply as Florimon has.  While the Twins did not raise payroll this season, if they choose to in the future, they can save a lot of money for pitching and other positions if they have a player like Florimon at short.    

All of this hinges on Florimon's defense.  If he is as good defensively as we saw last year, the Twins may have found a valuable commodity, at a bargain basement price.  The fatal flaw would be that Florimon's biggest asset is also very hard to properly quantify.  Personally, I trust defensive metrics, but many do not.  If his defense is not being properly evaluated, his value cannot be accurately calculated.  Offense is easy to see on the field and in a spreadsheet, but defense is much tougher.  

It's more than just defense though, it's more defense by cost.  If Florimon was making $3 million next season, I wouldn't be writing this.  Fortunately for the Twins, he will be one of their cheapest players.  He may not be a sexy player, but I do know that short of better options, a Florimon type makes sense and clearly other teams agree with the Twins.    

Friday, March 8, 2013

Further Investigation into the Lack of Quality Middle Infielders


Last weekend, I introduced the Gagne Threshold.  I used a variety of criteria to find good middle infielders over the past 30 seasons.  I'm not going to go through everything again, but if you missed it and want to take a look, you can find it here.  To summarize, I found 63 good players, 33 at second and 30 at short.  I also found that there wasn't a specific team that was more or less adept at finding these players, as the sample is so small that no team really stands out.  In the end, 30 shortstops in 30 years seemed like an impossibly low number.  However, the number on its own isn't all that useful, unless it can be compared to other positions. 

Therefore, I decided to investigate if the middle infield positions have been harder to fill with good players over the past 30 years.  Career numbers aren't as important to me, so I focused on seasonal data.  If a team has five or six good, young middle infielders that they rotate through, they may not produce good career players, but would still get good value at those positions on a relatively regular basis. 

I looked at each offensive position, year-by-year, over the past 30 seasons.  I wanted to know how many players would be considered "good" in each year and how "good" the best players were during those 30 seasons.  I decided to use WAR again.  Terrible toothbrush analogies aside, I do think WAR is the best available measure that we can use to compare players from 2012 to 1983.  It isn't perfect, but it gives us some information, which is better than just throwing our hands up in the air and crying under the bed. 

FanGraphs.com has an excellent explanation of how they calculate WAR.  You can start here, and choose to read as much as you'd like.  I read through the all the pages, and I feel that I understand their methods very well.  FanGraphs outlines a player with a 2+ WAR as being a solid starter or better, which is a number I will be using as the basis of this analysis.

Here are the two factors I investigated:
  •         How many players provided a 2+ WAR at each position, in each season?  This was an easy way to look at how many good players each position supplied.
  •         What was the cumulative WAR for the top ten players at each position?  This allowed me to compare the actual value given at each position.

Here is my resulting chart:

Year
# of 2+ WAR
2+ WAR/ Season
Top 10 Total WAR
Top 10 Avg WAR
Top 10 Player Avg WAR
C
417
13.90
1131.8
37.73
3.77
1B
564
18.80
1512.1
50.40
5.04
2B
487
16.23
1307.6
43.59
4.36
3B
569
18.97
1472.8
49.09
4.91
SS
442
14.73
1308.6
43.62
4.36
LF
592
19.73
1475.2
49.17
4.92
CF
617
20.57
1541.9
51.40
5.14
RF
624
20.80
1427
47.57
4.76
OF
1625
18.06
4389.8
48.78
4.88

I am terrible at labeling fields, so let me just clarify:
  •          # of 2+ WAR = Number of players with 2+ WAR in the last 30 seasons
  •          # of 2+ WAR/Season = Average number of players with 2+ WAR, over 30 seasons
  •          Top 10 Total WAR = Total WAR from all top ten players, added together from the last 30 seasons
  •          Top 10 Avg WAR = Seasonal average for the top ten players (as a whole), by WAR
  •          Top 10 Player Avg WAR = Average WAR for a top ten player, over the past 30 seasons

I broke down outfielders by individual position, but also by all outfielders.  I did this because many outfielders played multiple outfield positions.  The OF value is most accurate, but the LF, CF and RF values are still interesting to look at.

The results show that the two middle infield positions are pretty hard to find, compared with all other positions other than catcher.  Catcher is the hardest position to fill, according to these findings.  The number of 2+ WAR second basemen was higher, but the overall WAR value was almost identical.  So, it seems to be easier to find second basemen, but good shortstops provide more value.  In short, the average top ten middle infielder between 1983 and 2012 provided 4.36 WAR.  

Teams get roughly 10-15% less value from the middle infield, compared with corner infield and outfield.  Of course, teams get even less value from catcher.  Having Joe Mauer on the team over the last 9 seasons has been a really big boost for the Twins.  Just finding a good catcher is hard to do, but having a consistently good catcher is extremely hard to pull off.  Of course, that is a separate topic. 

The average top ten middle infielder provides about .5 WAR less than the average top ten player at nearly every other position.  This shows that teams are often playing middle infielders that are not only below average, but below the quality of players at other positions.  Something to keep in mind about WAR is that the stat already gives players credit for playing these difficult positions, so some of their value actually comes from simply playing the position, saying nothing about how well they play it. 

Basically, if two players are completely equal in all ways - batting, slugging, baserunning, defense, etc, the shortstop will have a higher WAR than the first baseman, simply for playing the more difficult position; shortstop more than second base, but still.  So, the actual production of these players might even be worse than would be indicated in my chart.  By giving these middle infielders an automatic bump, their WARs are artificially inflated (on purpose).  In addition, the first basemen and corner outfielders are actually penalized in WAR, ever widening the gap. 

There is logic in the positional adjustments made when calculating WAR.  However, these adjustments show that if the sample of shortstops and first basemen are about .5 WAR apart, their production might actually be much farther off than one might think, just looking at WAR.  Finding a good shortstop or second baseman is clearly hard to find, and that is why these players get a boost in their value. 

The actual production is important though.  We can see that over the past 30 seasons, the middle infield has provided less value than most of the other positions and that good middle infielders are clearly rarer than good players at most of the other positions.  While this may seem like an obvious conclusion, having the research and data to support the conclusion is very important. 

The next step is to investigate the samples of good second basemen and shortstops.  Where does their value come from?  Why are they more rare than players at other positions?  I'm working on analyzing some data and I hope to share it with you very soon.  Stay tuned!

Bonus!  Here is a chart of the top 20 players by WAR, last season.  There were 9.5 outfielders (Zobrist was the .5), 5 third basemen, 2 catchers, 2 second basemen, and 1.5 shortstops (Zobrist again).  There was just one middle infielder in the top 10.  Just thought it was an interesting snapshot:

Name
WAR
Pos
10
OF
8
C
7.9
OF
7.8
2B
7.8
3B
7.5
3B
7.4
OF
7.1
3B
6.6
OF
6.5
3B
6.5
C
6.5
3B
6.4
OF
6.2
2B
5.9
OF
5.9
OF/MI
5.9
OF
5.5
OF
5.4
SS
5.3
OF

Finally, here is a link to the spreadsheet I created while doing this research.  It breaks down most of this data annually, and it is pretty interesting to look at:  Raw data

Addendum:

Someone on the Twins' Daily Forum asked about middle infield offense.  Here is what I found:

wRC+ is my metric of choice. wRC+ is slick because all the factors that create runs are put together and then the values are normalized and adjusted for park factors and era. Thus, you can compare Greg Gagne to Brendan Ryan, to see who was the better hitter. The metric is based off of the number 100, where 100 is average and each corresponding number is a percentage above or below. So, Gagne's career wRC+ is 82, meaning he was 18% below league average for his career. 

I decided to look by position, to see if good, offensive shortstops are particularly rare. I decided I had no use for players with fewer than 500 games played. Roughly three seasons worth of games seems like a decent sample size. Here is my resulting chart:


# of PlayersGood OffenseGood %
C2384619.33%
1B23013759.57%
2B2845218.31%
3B2498433.73%
SS2392410.04%
LF34115043.99%
CF2697628.25%
RF29614348.31%

500 games min


n is the number of players, "good" refers to players with above average offensive production (wRC+ > 100) and "good %" shows what percentage of each sample met that criteria. As you can see, the further down the defensive spectrum you go, the harder it is to find a good offensive player at that position. This is hardly breaking news. The part that surprised me was just how small the sample was at short. There were only 24 players from the past 30 seasons who posted a career wRC+ over 100.